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1 Introduction
Increasing economic integration has made the choice of commodity tax base
an important policy issue, especially within the European Union (EU). Gener-
ally, internationally traded commodities are taxed according to the destination
principle, i.e. taxed in the country of consumption. Under the origin princi-
ple goods are taxed in the country of production. Since administration of the
destination principle requires border tax adjustments — with imports being
brought under domestic taxation and exports taken out of it — an increase in
the movement of goods across borders leads to higher compliance costs and
difficulty in enforcement of border tax adjustments. Therefore, in terms of ad-
ministration costs alone, the origin principle is favourable as barriers to trade
fall. Recognizing this, and with the completion of the single market in 1993,
the European Commission proposed moving from a value-added tax (VAT)
system based on the destination principle to one based on the origin principle.
However as a result of political deadlock amongst EU Member States, the Eu-
ropean Commission proposed in 2011 that the move to the origin principle be
abandoned in favour of a reformed system based on the destination principle.
A 1987 proposal on harmonization of the VAT rates also met opposition, and
instead a minimum standard rate of 15 per cent was introduced in 1993. Apart
from this minimum rate, Member States are free to set their own tax rates.
This leads to the possibility that commodity taxation is used strategically in
much the same way as tariffs and other trade restrictions could be used before
their abolition within the EU.1 Our focus is on how the resulting commodity
tax competition between governments differs under the two tax principles and
the implications for welfare.
The innovation of this paper is to introduce a horizontal foreign direct
investment (FDI) decision into a model of tax competition with imperfectly
competitive firms. Since the early 1980s, the value of sales of foreign affiliates
of multinational firms has been larger than that of global exports. According
to the United Nations’ World Investment Report 2011, sales of foreign affili-
ates in 2008 were US$33.3 trillion whereas exports of goods and non-factor
services in the same year were only US$19.8 trillion. Given the significance
of FDI in the world economy, it is important to understand how the presence
of FDI affects the nature of tax competition and hence welfare. We demon-
strate that consumption-based taxation welfare-dominates production-based
1 There is a large literature on the strategic use of tariffs (e.g. Brander and Spencer 1984), ex-
port subsidies (e.g. Brander and Spencer 1985), and other trade policy instruments in oligopolistic
industries.
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taxation for a large range of investment costs. This finding is in contrast to
much of the existing literature which has tended to support the origin princi-
ple under imperfect competition with a fixed market structure.
A number of papers have used models of imperfect competition to look
at the choice of commodity tax base when countries set their taxes noncoop-
eratively.2 Keen and Lahiri (1998) employ a duopoly model with integrated
markets, a homogeneous good, and no transport costs, and show that taxation
under the origin principle leads to the first-best outcome when taxes are set
non-cooperatively and the firms and countries are symmetric. Haufler et al
(2005) focus on the role of trade costs. Using a two-country symmetric re-
ciprocal dumping model of international trade in identical commodities, they
find that that the origin principle is Pareto efficient for any level of trade costs
when demand is linear. Furthermore, for nonlinear demand and high trade
costs the destination principle dominates, while for low trade costs the origin
principle dominates, lending some support to the use of the origin principle
in more integrated economies. Hashimzade et al (2005) show that the results
of Haufler et al (2005) are robust to some degree of product differentiation,
and also to differentiated Bertrand competition. Hashimzade et al (2011) in-
troduce country asymmetry in the same model, by allowing for differences in
country size and production efficiency. The presence of asymmetries can lead
to disagreement between countries over the best tax principle: large countries
and inefficient countries prefer the origin principle whereas small countries
and efficient countries tend to prefer the destination principle.
Despite the increasing importance of international capital flows, few pa-
pers have considered the effects of the choice of tax base on location or entry
decisions. Haufler and Pflu¨ger (2004) investigate the welfare implications of
the two tax principles in a model with free entry. Using a symmetric two-
country model of monopolistic competition with transport costs and interna-
tional mobility of capital and firms, they find that tax competition under the
destination principle will lead to the first-best outcome, while the tax rate un-
der the origin principle deviates from the Pareto efficient level. Behrens et al
(2007, 2009) compare the tax principles in a model of monopolistic compe-
tition with endogenous location choices and asymmetric country sizes, and
find that although tax competition tends to decrease tax revenues under the
origin principle compared to the destination principle, the spatial distribution
2 Under perfect competition, the destination principle is favorable because it warrants produc-
tion efficiency when countries set different tax rates (see Mintz and Tulkens 1986; Kanbur and
Keen 1993) unless terms of trade effects become dominant (Lockwood 1993). See Lockwood
(2001) for a detailed survey of cooperative and non-cooperative commodity taxation.
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of industry is more equal under the former. Such models lack strategic inter-
action between firms, and are hard to compare directly to those with Cournot
competition. Accordingly, McCracken and Sta¨hler (2010) extend the model
of Haufler et al (2005) to allow for free entry. Under the destination princi-
ple with a fixed market structure and segmented markets, the two markets are
independent (i.e. a tax in one market has no effect on activity in the other mar-
ket). Free entry creates a link between the markets in the form of entry and
exit of firms, leading to quite different results. With free entry, the destination
principle dominates the origin principle when trade costs are high or demand
is linear. For lower levels of trade costs and non-linear demand, the welfare
ranking of the two tax bases is ambiguous.
Given the importance of FDI in serving foreign markets, we extend the
model of Haufler et al (2005) in another direction. We allow for the possibility
that firms want to engage in trade-cost jumping horizontal FDI by introducing
a preliminary location decision to the game. This decision takes the form of
whether to build a new plant in the firm’s export market at some fixed cost.
Firms make their investment decisions before the governments set their tax
rates. In this respect our model differs from much of the literature on compe-
tition for FDI (e.g. Motta and Thisse 1994; Markusen et al 1995; Haufler and
Wooton 1999; Beladi et al 1999) where it is most common to assume that the
governments make their policy choices before the firms choose their locations.
Because of the discrete nature of location choices, there can be an incentive in
such models for governments to undercut each other in order to attract FDI.
Comparatively few papers (e.g. Hoel 1997; Ulph and Valentini 2001) consider
the timing we adopt here where the firms make their location choices first and
so take into account the effect their decisions will have on the governments’
tax rates. Although the model is symmetric, there is the possibility that the
equilibrium distribution of plants is asymmetric with only one firm undertak-
ing FDI. Just as the exogenous asymmetry in countries did in Hashimzade
et al (2011), this endogenous asymmetry in plant distribution can lead to dis-
agreements (ex post) about which is the best tax principle. Such disagreements
cannot occur in the absence of potential FDI in symmetric models. In contrast
to Behrens et al (2009), we find that asymmetry of plant location in equilib-
rium can only occur under the origin principle because, under the destination
principle, the firms’ investment decisions are independent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic structure of
the model. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the optimal non-cooperative tax rates un-
der the destination principle and origin principle and determine the subgame-
perfect equilibria. Section 5 compares the subgame-perfect equilibrium out-
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comes under the two tax regimes. Section 6 concludes the paper. For expo-
sitional clarity, we have relegated most of the mathematical derivations and
proofs to the appendix.
2 The model
The model is adapted from De Santis and Sta¨hler (2009). Building on the re-
ciprocal dumping model of Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983)
by adding a preliminary plant location decision, it is similar in structure to
Horstmann and Markusen’s (1992) model of endogenous market structures.
There are two countries, domestic and foreign, with variables for the latter
country denoted by an asterisk. There are two goods, X and Z, in each coun-
try. The two countries have the same endowment E of the homogeneous good
Z, which acts as the numeraire in our model.3 Countries are identical in size
and have the same quasilinear preferences
U(X ,Z) = u(X)+Z = aX− bX
2
2
+Z, (1)
where X is the consumption of the oligopolistically produced good. This sim-
ple form of preferences allow us to solve the model explicitly. Located in each
country is the headquarters of one firm producing good X and earning profits
Π . The goods produced by these firms are subject to taxes. Tax revenue is
denoted by T and is returned as a lump sum to the representative consumer,
whose budget constraint is therefore
pX +Z =Π +T +E.
Maximization of utility (1) subject to the budget constraint gives the domestic
inverse demand curve
p(X) = a−bX . (2)
The appropriate measure of welfare, W , is the indirect utility of the represen-
tative consumer. Using (1), (2) and the budget constraint, welfare is the sum
of profits, consumer surplus CS, tax revenues and the endowment
W =Π +CS+T +E.
3 E is large enough that consumption of X is always positive.
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Stage 0:
A tax principle is agreed upon.
Stage 1:
Firms decide whether to be a multinational or national firm.
Stage 2:
Governments simultaneously set their tax rates.
Stage 3:
Firms compete in a Cournot fashion.
Fig. 1: Game structure
With the linear inverse demand function (2), domestic consumer surplus is
given by bX2/2. In what follows we will ignore the term E, because it plays
no role in the welfare comparisons.
We will refer to a firm that has only one plant in its home country, and
supplies its overseas market through exports, as a national firm. A firm with a
plant in each country, and supplying each market through the corresponding
plant will be called a multinational firm.
The timing of the game is described in Figure 1. In stage 0, the countries
have agreed to both tax under the destination or the origin principle. Before
the countries simultaneously choose their tax rates, the firms choose simulta-
neously whether to open a plant in the other country. Having firms make their
investment decision first is intended to capture the idea that without some way
of committing to a tax rate, governments may have an incentive to change the
tax rate after firms have located. Firms, recognizing this possibility would
then ignore any announced tax rate and make their investment choice based
on what the governments would choose if they were to move second. We are
assuming here that the firms are not footloose; their investments in plant give
them some commitment power.
In order to solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game, we use
backward induction. There are four possible configurations of plant location:
one in which both firms are national, another in which both firms are multi-
national, and two in which one firm is national and the other multinational.
We will call the subgames with initial node at stage 2, the taxation subgames.
First, we proceed by assuming that it is profitable to be in each of the taxa-
tion subgames and solve for the subgame equilibrium outputs and tax rates.
Finally, we determine the first-stage FDI decisions of the firms by comparing
profits in each taxation subgame.
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3 Destination principle
First we consider the equilibrium when goods are taxed in the country of con-
sumption. All sales in the domestic market are unstarred, while all sales in the
foreign market are starred. A y (starred, or unstarred) denotes sales of a firm
in its home market, while an x denotes sales of a firm in its overseas market.
Thus y denotes production of the domestic firm for the domestic market while
x∗ denotes production of the domestic firm for the foreign market. For the for-
eign firm, y∗ denotes its production for the foreign market while x denotes its
production for the domestic market. This notation is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Notation for domestic and foreign market sales.
Location of sales
Firm Domestic Foreign
Domestic y x∗
Foreign x y∗
Clearing of the goods markets requires X = x+ y and X∗ = x∗+ y∗. Pro-
duction at any plant incurs the same constant marginal cost of c, where c < a,
while exports incur the additional trade cost s per unit. The following assump-
tion on s ensures that exporting takes place under intra-industry trade.
Assumption 1. s < 2(a−c)3 .
Under the destination principle, goods are taxed in the country of their
consumption and so the domestic firm faces the domestic government’s choice
of specific tax t on its domestic sales, and the foreign government’s tax t∗ on
its sales in the foreign market. A firm faces a fixed cost F to set up its head-
quarters and home plant, and an additional cost G to open a plant abroad.
Markets are segmented so that firms can treat each country as a different mar-
ket. Profits of national firms under the destination principle are
ΠDn = (p− c− t)y+(p∗− c− t∗− s)x∗−F, (3)
ΠD
∗
n = (p
∗− c− t∗)y∗+(p− c− t− s)x−F. (4)
When the domestic firm becomes a multinational, it avoids the trade cost for
all units sold in the foreign market but must incur the fixed plant cost G. Since
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goods are taxed where they are consumed, the appropriate tax for the product
it sells overseas remains t∗. Thus profits for multinationals are given by
ΠDm = (p− c− t)y+(p∗− c− t∗)x∗−F−G, (5)
ΠD
∗
m = (p
∗− c− t∗)y∗+(p− c− t)x−F−G. (6)
The fixed cost F is assumed to be small enough such that production of the
good is profitable. We will ignore this term in what follows, as it plays no role
in the determination of equilibrium or the welfare comparisons. Before we
discuss each of the taxation subgames, it is worth pointing out that whatever
the location decisions of the firms, the tax base in the domestic (foreign) mar-
ket is x+y (x∗+y∗). The optimal taxes will however depend on the investment
choices of the firms. When a firm becomes a multinational, it avoids the trade
costs, and this ultimately affects the balance of the incentives for taxation.
3.1 The intra-industry trade taxation subgame
We begin by examining the equilibrium of the subgame in which neither firm
has invested in a new plant, and there is intra-industry trade. In this case,
domestic welfare is given by4
W DI =Π
D
I +CS
D
I +T
D
I
= (p− c− t)y+(p∗− c− t∗− s)x∗+u(X)− pX + tX , (7)
where the subscript I denotes equilibrium values in the intra-industry trade
taxation subgame. To provide some intuition for the incentives of the domestic
government when setting its tax, we differentiate the above welfare expression
with respect to t:5
∂W DI
∂ t
= (p− c)∂y
∂ t
− x∂ p
∂ t
+
∂ tx
∂ t
=
1
9b
[−(a− c+2t+ s)−2(a− c− t−2s)+3(a− c−2t−2s)], (8)
4 Note that although this welfare is calculated given the final-stage equilibrium outputs (Ap-
pendix A) we have suppressed the tax principle superscript D, and subgame subscript I for ease
of readability.
5 This expression follows because u′(X) = p(X) and under the destination principle, given our
assumptions of market segmentation, the domestic tax has no effect on the foreign market.
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where the second line uses the expressions for final-stage equilibrium output
(see Appendix A).
Since many of the effects are just transfers between consumers and firms,
we are left with just three terms. The first is the domestic production efficiency
effect, which is present even in a closed economy, and measures the increase
in efficiency as domestic production of goods whose price exceeds marginal
cost increases; the second is the terms of trade effect which measures the rise
in welfare when the price the domestic country pays for imports falls; the
third is the tax revenue effect which represents the incentive to tax the foreign
firm’s exports.6
Setting (8) equal to zero yields the nationally optimal destination principle
tax rate tˆDI . By symmetry, the optimal tax rate for the foreign government tˆ
D∗
I
is identical. The optimal taxes are given by
tˆDI = tˆ
D∗
I =
1
6
[−(a− c+ s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I),(-)
−2(a− c−2s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II),(-/+)
+3(a− c−2s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(III),(+/-)
] =− s
2
. (9)
We identify the three incentives: (I) is the domestic production efficiency in-
centive; (II) is the terms of trade incentive; (III) is the tax revenue incentive.
The domestic production efficiency incentive always favours a subsidy to in-
crease production of the good. When trade costs are zero, the three effects
exactly cancel. When trade costs are small the terms of trade incentive is
negative, while the tax revenue incentive is positive. Together (I) and (III)
represent profits shifted from the foreign firm to the domestic country. This
is the well-known profit-shifting incentive identified by Brander and Spencer
(1985) when analysing export subsidies and other trade policy instruments.7
The balance of incentives is such that for all positive levels of trade costs the
optimal tax is negative.
Given the optimal tax rates, the equilibrium profits and welfare when intra-
industry trade takes place under the destination tax regime are
ΠˆDI = Πˆ
D∗
I =
4(a− c)2+9s2
18b
, (10)
Wˆ DI = Wˆ
D∗
I =
8(a− c)2−3s[2(a− c)−3s]
18b
.
6 There is no effect on the export price, because with segmented markets and a fixed market
structure the tax affects production only in the domestic market.
7 In particular, the decomposition in (8) corresponds to the decomposition in equation (4.12)
of the welfare effects of a tariff in Brander (1995).
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3.2 The bilateral FDI taxation subgame
When both firms invest in a new plant and become multinationals, profits
for the domestic and foreign firm are given by expressions (5) and (6) re-
spectively. Apart from the absence of trade costs and the firms incurring an
extra fixed cost, the bilateral FDI subgame equilibrium is identical to the intra-
industry trade equilibrium. Modifying (9) and (10) accordingly gives the equi-
librium tax rates tˆDB = tˆ
D∗
B = 0, and the profits and welfare in the bilateral FDI
equilibrium:
ΠˆDB = Πˆ
D∗
B =
2(a− c)2
9b
−G, (11)
Wˆ DB = Wˆ
D∗
B =
4(a− c)2
9b
−G.
3.3 The unilateral FDI taxation subgame
Finally, we examine the taxation subgame in which the first-stage choices of
the domestic and foreign firm are different. In finding the equilibrium, we
assume that it is only the foreign firm that has invested in a new plant. The re-
sults of the previous two sections can be used to find the optimal tax rates. The
domestic market looks the same as under bilateral FDI, with it being served
by two plants located in the domestic country. Since the segmented markets
assumption renders the two markets independent, the domestic government’s
optimal tax rate is identical to that under bilateral FDI, i.e. tˆDU = 0. Similarly,
the foreign market looks the same as under intra-industry trade, so the for-
eign government’s optimal tax rate is tˆD∗U = −s/2. Profits and welfare in the
unilateral FDI equilibrium are
ΠˆDU =
8(a− c)2−3s[4(a− c)−3s]
36b
, (12)
ΠˆD∗U =
8(a− c)2+3s[4(a− c)+3s]
144b
−G,
Wˆ DU =
16(a− c)2−3s[4(a− c)−3s]
36b
, Wˆ D∗U =
16(a− c)2+9s2
36b
−G.
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3.4 Subgame-perfect equilibrium
Having found the equilibria of the taxation subgames and calculated the equi-
librium profits, we turn to the first-stage choice of firm FDI.8 In Figure 2 we
present the payoff matrix for the first-stage investment choice given the equi-
librium profits in each of the taxation subgames. The profits referred to in the
payoff matrix are given by expressions (10), (11), and (12).
Foreign firm
No FDI FDI
Domestic firm
No FDI ΠˆDI ,ΠˆD∗I ΠˆDU ,ΠˆD∗U
FDI ΠˆD∗U ,ΠˆDU ΠˆDB ,ΠˆD∗B
Fig. 2: Destination principle, stage 1 payoff matrix
If the domestic firm is not conducting FDI, the foreign firm has an incen-
tive to invest in a new plant only if its profit from doing so (12) is greater
than its profit in the intra-industry trade equilibrium (10). These profits are
the same when G is equal to
GD =
s[4(a− c)−3s]
12b
.
The domestic firm will also prefer to undertake investment if profits in the
bilateral FDI equilibrium (11) are higher than profits for it in the unilateral FDI
equilibrium (12). Profits for the domestic firm in the two subgames are equal
when G = GD. This demonstrates that for plant fixed costs below GD, FDI is
the dominant strategy while for higher G, no FDI is the dominant strategy.
Proposition 1. The subgame-perfect equilibrium plant configurations are as
follows.
(i) If G < GD, then there will be bilateral FDI.
(ii) If G > GD, then there will be intra-industry trade.
Although when G < GD both firms have a dominant strategy to invest —
and so bilateral FDI is the unique equilibrium — both firms would be better
8 We only consider pure strategy equilibria.
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off if they could agree to refrain from investing. For such levels of plant fixed
cost, the location game that the firms play in the first stage is a form of the
classical prisoners’ dilemma. There are three effects that the foreign firm has
to take into account when it decides whether to become a multinational. First,
there is a direct cost saving from avoiding s but this is counteracted somewhat
by the second effect — the domestic government responds to the investment
by withdrawing its subsidy of s/2. The net cost saving of becoming a multi-
national is then s/2 per unit. The third effect is that the domestic firm also no
longer receives a subsidy. FDI has two benefits for the investor — it is cost
saving and it raises the rival’s costs. When trade costs are zero, these effects
are no longer present and FDI cannot occur for any level of fixed cost.
Given the foreign firm has invested, the incentives for the domestic firm
are exactly the same. The segmented markets assumption means that under the
destination principle, the tax rate and output choices in the domestic (foreign)
market are independent of the domestic (foreign) firm’s investment choice.
This makes the investment choices of the two firms independent. Furthermore,
because of the symmetry of firms and countries, when it is profitable for one
firm to investment, it is also profitable for the other. This is true for any form
of inverse demand for which there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in each
of the taxation subgames. This result is presented in Proposition 2, the proof
of which is in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. When countries and firms are symmetric, markets are seg-
mented and goods are taxed under the destination principle, if one firm finds
it profitable to conduct FDI, then the other will also find it profitable.
4 Origin principle
We now turn to the case of production based taxation. Under the origin prin-
ciple, production is taxed by the country in which output is produced. Thus
the profits of national firms are
ΠOn = (p− c− t)y+(p∗− c− t− s)x∗−F, (13)
ΠO
∗
n = (p
∗− c− t∗)y∗+(p− c− t∗− s)x−F, (14)
and of multinational firms:
ΠOm = (p− c− t)y+(p∗− c− t∗)x∗−F−G, (15)
ΠO
∗
m = (p
∗− c− t∗)y∗+(p− c− t)x−F−G. (16)
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In contrast to the destination principle, each government’s tax base depends
on the location decisions of the firms. If both firms are national firms, then the
tax base for the domestic government is x∗+y; if both firms are multinationals
then the tax base is x+ y; if only the foreign firm is a multinational, then the
tax base is x+ y+ x∗; and if only the domestic firm is a multinational, then
the tax base is y. Note that because a multinational firm produces all its output
where it is sold, the profit expressions of multinational firms under the origin
principle are the same as under the destination principle, so that the bilateral
FDI equilibria will be the same.
In their paper, De Santis and Sta¨hler (2009), solve a version of this model
in the context of environmental regulation. Under the origin principle, the
only difference between that model and the one under consideration here is
the existence of pollution. Thus the subgame-perfect equilibrium under the
origin principle can be found by setting the marginal disutility of pollution
to zero in their results. We present only the analysis of the unilateral FDI
subgame. The equilibrium welfare and profits for the other subgames, along
with all the final-stage equilibrium outputs, are provided in Appendix B.
4.1 The unilateral FDI taxation subgame
Suppose the foreign firm invests but the domestic firm does not. Under the
resulting plant configuration, the foreign government’s tax applies only to the
foreign firm’s production for the foreign market. Differentiating foreign wel-
fare we have
∂W O∗U
∂ t∗
= (p∗− c)∂y
∗
∂ t∗
− x∗ ∂ p
∗
∂ t∗
. (17)
If the domestic firm’s exports are positive, the foreign government has to take
account of the production efficiency and terms of trade effects, both of which
call for a subsidy. When the domestic firm does not export, the foreign gov-
ernment has to correct only the monopoly distortion — this is achieved by
a subsidy such that the monopolist prices at marginal cost. It turns out (see
Appendix B) that, regardless of the export status of the domestic firm, the
optimal tax rate for the foreign government is tˆO∗U =−(a− c).
The domestic government’s tax applies to all the domestic firm’s produc-
tion, as well as the foreign firm’s production in its plant located in the domestic
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country. We differentiate domestic welfare to obtain
∂W OU
∂ t
= (p− c)∂y
∂ t
+(p∗− c− s)∂x
∗
∂ t
+
(
x∗
∂ p∗
∂ t
− x∂ p
∂ t
)
+
∂ tx
∂ t
. (18)
The effects from left to right are: the domestic production efficiency effect,
export production efficiency effect, terms of trade effect and the tax revenue
effect. The following lemma (which corresponds to Lemma 2 of De Santis
and Sta¨hler 2009) demonstrates an important difference in the effect of the
noncooperative tax rates under the origin and destination principles.
Lemma 1. Under the origin principle the national firm does not export at any
level of trade costs in the equilibrium of the unilateral FDI subgame.
The proof (see Appendix B) demonstrates that the domestic firm would
need to receive a subsidy, t <−s, from the domestic government in order for
its exports to compete with the heavily subsidized foreign firm’s output. How-
ever, the domestic government has no incentive to provide this subsidy. The
domestic production efficiency effect, the ‘import’ component of the terms
of trade effect (−x∂ p/∂ t), and the tax revenue effect together call for a zero
tax rate. Also, given the foreign government is providing a large subsidy on
its firm’s domestic output, the foreign price is so low that the export pro-
duction efficiency effect and ‘export’ component of the terms of trade effect
(x∗∂ p∗/∂ t) together are positive for any tax t < −s, implying that welfare
would be increased by raising the tax rate and driving the domestic firm’s
exports to zero.
When the domestic firm does not export, the incentives for the domestic
government are exactly the same as when bilateral FDI occurs under the origin
or destination principles because we have two firms producing in the domestic
market and being taxed by the domestic government. The optimal domestic
tax rate is thus tˆOU = 0. Profits and welfare in the unilateral FDI equilibrium
are
ΠˆOU =
(a− c)2
9b
, ΠˆO∗U =
10(a− c)2
9b
−G, (19)
Wˆ OU =
(a− c)2
3b
, Wˆ O∗U =
11(a− c)2
18b
−G.
In equilibrium, each firm has half the usual Cournot duopoly profits in the
domestic market, while the foreign firm also makes a profit equal to that of a
first-best subsidized monopoly in the foreign market.
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4.2 Subgame-perfect equilibrium
The foreign firm has an incentive to invest in a new plant unilaterally only if
profits when it does so (19) are greater than profit in the intra-industry trade
equilibrium (B.1). These profits are equal when plant fixed costs are given by
GO1 =
[22(a− c)−15s][2(a− c)+3s]
72b
.
The domestic firm would also like to invest if its profits in the bilateral FDI
equilibrium (B.2) are larger than in the unilateral FDI equilibrium (19). The
firm is indifferent when
GO2 =
(a− c)2
9b
.
The following proposition summarizes these results and is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3b.
Proposition 3. The subgame-perfect equilibrium plant configurations are as
follows.
(i) If G < GO2 , then there will be bilateral FDI.
(ii) If GO2 < G < G
O
1 , then there are two asymmetric equilibria in which one
firm sets up a plant in the other country and the other firm does not.
(iii) If G > GO1 , then there will be intra-industry trade.
When the foreign firm is making its investment decision, given that the
rival is a national firm, there are four effects to consider. First, there is the
trade cost saving of s per unit on production for its overseas market. Second,
when the foreign firm invests it no longer receives a subsidy on its produc-
tion for abroad. If s is large, then the net effect represents a cost saving; if
s is small, then it is cost raising.9 Third, the foreign firm knows that if it
invests, the domestic government will set a tax rate which makes exporting
unprofitable for the domestic firm and so enable the foreign firm to act as a
monopolist in its domestic market. The size of this effect decreases as trade
costs increase, because higher trade costs confer more market power on the
foreign firm’s production for its own market under intra-industry trade (at the
extreme, when trade costs are prohibitive, the domestic firm does not export
and the foreign firm is effectively a monopolist in its home market). Finally,
9 The lost subsidy is tˆOU − tˆOI = [2(a−c)−s]/4, so that the net effect is to change per-unit costs
by [2(a− c)−5s]/4.
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Fig. 3: Equilibrium plant configurations (I: Intra-industry trade, U: Unilateral
FDI, B: Bilateral FDI)
the domestic firm’s costs are raised by the withdrawal of the domestic govern-
ment’s subsidy.
Now consider the incentives for the domestic firm to conduct FDI once
the foreign firm has already invested. The domestic firm is not exporting in
the unilateral FDI equilibrium and setting up a plant in the foreign country
allows it to capture half of the total duopoly profits. In its own market, the
tax rate does not change and there is no change in profits. So, when making
a decision to invest, the domestic firm simply weighs the gain in profits from
production in its new plant against the cost of that plant.
In contrast to the destination principle, the investment incentives depend
on whether the other firm has invested or not. In particular the critical level of
plant fixed cost GO1 is a function of the trade costs, while G
O
2 is not. As under
the destination principle, when plant fixed costs are small (G < GO2 ), the firms
are subject to a prisoners’ dilemma — they would prefer intra-industry trade
to the bilateral FDI equilibrium, but they have a dominant strategy to invest.
5 Comparison of tax principles
In this section we compare the equilibrium outcomes under the two tax prin-
ciples. First we compare profits under the two tax regimes.
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Proposition 4.
(i) If G < GD, then profits are the same for both firms under both tax prin-
ciples.
(ii) If GD < G < GO2 , then profits are higher for both firms under the desti-
nation principle.
(iii) If GO2 < G < G
O
1 , then profits are higher for the national firm under the
destination principle, while profits are higher for the multinational firm
under the origin principle.
(iv) If GO1 < G, then profits are higher for both firms under the origin princi-
ple.
For GD < G < GO2 , because of the prisoners’ dilemma facing the firms
under the origin principle when making their investment choice, profits are
low in comparison to those in the intra-industry trade equilibrium under the
destination principle. When GO2 < G < G
O
1 , the firm that is a national firm
in the unilateral FDI equilibrium under the origin principle does not export
and earns low profits, while the multinational is a subsidized monopoly in its
home market and earns high profits. For G > GO1 , there is no FDI. Under the
destination principle each government’s tax applies to production by both the
domestic and foreign headquartered firms. While the domestic government
has an incentive to subsidize the domestic firm’s domestic output in order to
correct the inefficiently low level of output, there is a counteracting incentive
to tax the foreign firm’s output for the domestic market.10 However, under the
origin principle, each government’s tax falls only on its own firm’s production,
and there is no counteracting incentive for a positive tax. Therefore, both firms
receive a larger subsidy under the origin principle than under the destination
principle, and so both earn higher profits.
The main difference between the two tax principles’ effects on location
decisions is the absence of the unilateral FDI equilibrium under consumption-
based taxation. The following two propositions compare welfare under the
two regimes. Before we present the next proposition we introduce the critical
level of plant fixed cost,
G¯ =
(a− c− s)(a− c+3s)
6b
.
Proposition 5.
10 The balance of the terms of trade and tax revenue incentives identified in (9) is positive when
trade costs are not too high, i.e. s < (a− c)/2.
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Fig. 4: Dominant tax principle (assuming the foreign-owned firm is the multi-
national under unilateral FDI)
(i) If G < GD, then welfare is the same in both countries under both tax
principles.
(ii) If GD < G < GO2 , then welfare is higher in both countries under the
destination principle.
(iii) If GO2 < G < G¯, then welfare is higher in the domestic country under
the destination principle, while welfare is higher in the foreign country
under the origin principle.11
(iv) If G¯ < G < GO1 , then welfare is higher in both countries under the desti-
nation principle.
(v) If GO1 < G, then welfare is higher in both countries under the origin
principle.
Proposition 5 is illustrated in Figure 4a. When plant fixed costs are suf-
ficiently low (G < GD) there is bilateral FDI in equilibrium, and both tax
principles are equivalent. However, because of the prisoners’ dilemma faced
by the firms under the origin principle (but not under the destination principle)
when G is such that there is bilateral FDI under the origin principle but intra-
industry trade under the destination principle (i.e. GD < G < GO2 ), welfare is
higher under the latter.
11 Assuming the foreign-owned firm is the multinational in the unilateral FDI equilibrium under
the origin principle.
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Part (iii) is particularly interesting, because it shows there is the potential
for countries to disagree (ex post) over the best tax principle even if the coun-
tries and firms are ex ante symmetric. For trade costs GO2 < G < G
O
1 , there
is unilateral FDI under the origin principle and intra-industry trade under the
destination principle. The reason for the difference in welfare rankings in (iii)
is most easily seen by considering the case where trade costs are zero. In this
case the domestic market looks exactly the same under unilateral FDI as under
intra-industry trade. However, when there is unilateral FDI the foreign mar-
ket is served by a first-best subsidized monopolist, while under intra-industry
trade there is a duopoly. This ability to implement the first-best in the foreign
market under the origin principle leads to high welfare in the foreign country
relative to the destination principle as long as the cost of the foreign firm’s
domestic plant is relatively low (GO2 < G < G¯). On the other hand, under the
origin principle, the domestic country misses out on profits from exporting,
and so always prefers the destination principle.
Finally, part (v) is a restatement of a result from Haufler et al (2005) that
for the special case of linear demand, the origin principle is Pareto efficient
under intra-industry trade and so dominates the destination principle. Their
results show that the origin principle remains Pareto efficient for nonlinear
demand if integration is complete (s = 0), but for intermediate levels of trade
costs and nonlinear demand it may be that the destination principle dominates.
Given the difference in welfare ranking for plant fixed costs GO2 < G < G¯,
it is natural to look at which principle leads to a higher combined welfare.
Before presenting the proposition comparing combined welfare, we introduce
a further critical level of plant fixed cost,
G˘ =
(a− c)2+6s[2(a− c)−3s]
18b
.
Proposition 6.
(i) If GO2 < G < G˘, then world welfare is higher under the origin principle.
(ii) If max{GO2 , G˘}< G < GO1 , then world welfare is higher under the desti-
nation principle.12
Proposition 6 is illustrated in Figure 4b. We see that for GO2 <G < G˘ there
is the potential for the foreign country, in which the multinational is headquar-
tered, to compensate the domestic country so that welfare is higher for both
countries under the origin principle. For these relatively low plant fixed costs,
12 Note that GO2 ≤ (>)G˘ if s ∈ (/∈)[ 16 (a− c)(2−
√
2), 16 (a− c)(2+
√
2)].
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the combined welfare is relatively high because the foreign monopoly in the
unilateral FDI equilibrium is producing at the first-best level. However, as
plant fixed costs increase, this welfare gain is eventually outweighed so that
for larger fixed costs max{GO2 , G˘}<G<GO1 the destination principle leads to
higher combined welfare. Notice, in particular, that when integration is com-
plete (s = 0) combined welfare is higher under the destination principle for
all fixed costs G < GO1 . Except for a small range of intermediate and for very
large plant fixed costs (for which FDI is then not an important factor), the
destination principle leads to higher combined welfare levels.
6 Concluding remarks
Despite the importance of FDI, it has largely been neglected in the existing
literature on the choice between origin and destination principle. The main
contribution of this paper was to introduce FDI in a model of tax competi-
tion and study the consequences for welfare. In terms of overall welfare, the
destination principle was found to weakly dominate the origin principle for
most trade costs and plant fixed costs such that at least one firm undertakes
FDI in equilibrium. Our results lend some support to the use of the destination
principle when there is the potential for FDI. This is in contrast to a result of
Haufler et al (2005) — whose model is identical to ours other than excluding
FDI — that the origin principle is Pareto efficient for all levels of trade costs
when demand is linear.
We also showed that there can be disagreement (ex post) over the pre-
ferred tax principle because of the potential for an asymmetric equilibrium
distribution of plants under the origin principle but not under the destination
principle. Asymmetry of plant location cannot happen under the destination
principle because the incentives for a firm to invest are the same whether or
not the other firm has invested. When asymmetry of plants occurs under the
origin principle — with two plants in the domestic country and one in the
foreign country — there is a strong incentive for the foreign country to pro-
vide a large subsidy to the firm headquartered in its country, while on the
other hand the domestic country has little incentive to subsidize the foreign-
headquartered firm’s domestic plant production for the domestic market. This
drives the domestic firm’s exports to zero, so that profits and welfare in the
domestic country are small compared to under the destination principle. The
range of plant costs for which there is disagreement over tax principles is
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highest for intermediate trade costs; it is lowest when integration is complete
or trade costs are near prohibitive.
The symmetry of plant location under the destination principle would not
be affected if product differentiation under quantity or price competition were
introduced, because the argument of Proposition 2 would still hold. The fun-
damental difference between the tax principles remains: given the assumption
of segmented markets, the two markets and thus the firms’ investment deci-
sions are independent under the destination principle, whereas under the ori-
gin principle these decisions are interdependent. The symmetry of the model
then ensures that under the destination principle both firms make the same
investment decision in equilibrium. We expect that the welfare rankings un-
der differentiated quantity competition would be qualitatively similar to those
in the homogeneous good case. However it may be that the welfare rankings
change under price competition. This is a subject for future research.
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Appendix
A Destination principle (DP)
Intra-industry trade
Using (2), (3) and (4) the first order conditions for profit maximization imply that outputs in the
intra-industry trade equilibrium are as follows
yDI =
a− c− t+ s
3b
, xDI =
a− c− t−2s
3b
, yD∗I =
a− c− t∗+ s
3b
, xD∗I =
a− c− t∗−2s
3b
.
Bilateral FDI
From (2), (5) and (6), maximization of profits gives us the following equilibrium output levels
xDB = y
D
B =
a− c− t
3b
, xD∗B = y
D∗
B =
a− c− t∗
3b
.
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Unilateral FDI
Under unilateral FDI, the domestic market is the same as under bilateral FDI, while the foreign
market is the same as under intra-industry trade, so that
xDU = y
D
U =
a− c− t
3b
, yD∗U =
a− c− t∗+ s
3b
xD∗U =
a− c− t∗−2s
3b
.
To check that these outputs are positive in equilibrium, note that substitution of the optimal tax
rates tˆD∗I = tˆD∗U = −s/2 and tˆD∗B = tˆDU = 0 into the relevant output expressions above shows that
we require s < 2(a−c)3 for them all to be positive. This is Assumption 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any inverse demand function p(X) for which a unique equi-
librium exists in each of the taxation subgames. Suppose it is profitable for the foreign firm to
undertake FDI given the domestic firm has not. Then
ΠˆD∗U − ΠˆD∗I = (pˆ∗U − c− tˆ∗U )yˆ∗U +(pˆU − c− tˆU )xˆU −G
− [(pˆ∗I − c− tˆ∗I )yˆ∗I +(pˆI − c− tˆI − s)xˆI ]
= (pˆU − c− tˆU )xˆU −G− (pˆI − c− tˆI − s)xˆI > 0,
where the second line follows from the fact that, because markets are segmented, pˆ∗U = pˆ∗I , tˆ∗U =
tˆ∗I , yˆ∗U = yˆ∗I and xˆ∗B = xˆ∗U . Now consider the domestic firm’s decision. The domestic firm will also
invest if
ΠˆDB − ΠˆDU = (pˆB− c− tˆB)yˆB +(pˆ∗B− c− tˆ∗B)xˆ∗B−G
− [(pˆU − c− tˆU )yˆU +(pˆ∗U − c− tˆ∗U − s)xˆ∗U ]
= (pˆ∗B− c− tˆ∗B)xˆ∗B−G− (pˆ∗U − c− tˆ∗U − s)xˆ∗U > 0,
where the second equality follows because the segmented markets assumption implies there is no
change in the domestic market equilibrium price, tax or output: pˆB = pˆU , tˆB = tˆU , and yˆB = yˆU .
Furthermore, because of symmetry, it must be that pˆ∗B = pˆB, tˆ∗B = tˆB, xˆ∗B = xˆB, pˆ∗I = pˆI , tˆ∗I = tˆI
and xˆ∗I = xˆI . But then symmetry together with the market segmentation assumption implies that
pˆ∗B = pˆU , tˆ∗B = tˆU , xˆ∗B = xˆU , pˆ∗U = pˆI , tˆ∗U = tˆI and xˆ∗U = xˆI . It then follows that
ΠˆDB − ΠˆDU = (pˆU − c− tˆU )xˆU −G− (pˆI − c− tˆI − s)xˆI > 0.
B Origin principle (OP)
Intra-industry trade
Using (2), (13) and (14), profit maximization gives:
yOI =
a− c−2t+ t∗+ s
3b
, xOI =
a− c−2t∗+ t−2s
3b
,
yO∗I =
a− c−2t∗+ t+ s
3b
, xO∗I =
a− c−2t+ t∗−2s
3b
.
Equilibrium taxes are tˆOI = tˆ
O∗
I =−(2(a− c)− s)/4 < 0, while profit and welfare levels are
ΠˆOI = Πˆ
O∗
I = Wˆ
O
I = Wˆ
O∗
I =
4(a− c)2− s[4(a− c)−5s]
8b
. (B.1)
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Bilateral FDI
The equilibrium is identical to the bilateral FDI equilibrium under DP:
xOB = y
O
B =
a− c− t
3b
, xO∗B = y
O∗
B =
a− c− t∗
3b
.
Equilibrium taxes are tˆOB = tˆ
O∗
B = 0, while profit and welfare levels are
ΠˆOB = Πˆ
O∗
B =
2(a− c)2
9b
−G, Wˆ OB = Wˆ O∗B =
4(a− c)2
9b
−G. (B.2)
Unilateral FDI
Using (2), (13) and (16), the equilibrium outputs in the domestic market are
xOU = y
O
U =
a− c− t
3b
. (B.3)
If the domestic firm exports, the equilibrium output levels in the foreign market are
xO∗U =
a− c−2t+ t∗−2s
3b
, yO∗U =
a− c−2t∗+ t+ s
3b
. (B.4)
If the domestic firm does not export, the equilibrium output levels in the foreign market are
xO∗U = 0, y
O∗
U =
a− c− t∗
2b
. (B.5)
We now solve for the foreign government’s optimal tax. Using (17), (B.3), (B.4) and the starred
equivalent of (2), the effect of the foreign tax rate on foreign welfare when the domestic firm
exports is
∂W O∗U
∂ t∗
=−2(a− c+ s+ t+ t
∗)
9b
− a− c−2s−2t+ t
∗
9b
.
Setting this to zero gives t∗ = −(a− c). Using (17), (B.3), (B.5) and the starred version of (2),
when the domestic firm does not export we have
∂W O∗U
∂ t∗
=−a− c+ t
∗
4b
.
Setting this to zero gives t∗ =−(a− c). So, no matter the export status of the domestic firm, the
optimal tax is tˆO∗U =−(a− c).
Proof of Lemma 1. The final-stage equilibrium outputs for the domestic market are independent
of whether or not the domestic (national) firm exports. Substituting them into (18) gives
∂W OU
∂ t
=− (a− c+2t)
9b
(−1
3b
)
+(p∗− c− s) ∂x
∗
∂ t
+
(
x∗
∂ p∗
∂ t
− 2(a− c− t)
9b
)
+
a− c−2t
3b
=− 2t
3b
+(p∗− c− s) ∂x
∗
∂ t
+ x∗
∂ p∗
∂ t
.
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The first term shows that the domestic production efficiency effect, the ‘import’ component of the
terms of trade effect, and the tax revenue effect together call for a zero tax rate. Given the foreign
tax rate of −(a− c), xO∗U > 0 if and only if t <−s. But if t <−s, then
(p∗− c− s) ∂x
∗
∂ t
+ x∗
∂ p∗
∂ t
=
−2(t−2s)
9b
+
2(s+ t)
9b
=
2s
3b
so that
∂W OU
∂ t
=− 2t
3b
+
2s
3b
=
2(s− t)
3b
>
4s
3b
≥ 0.
It follows that t <−s cannot be optimal and therefore the domestic firm does not export.
C Comparison of tax principles
Proof of Proposition 4.
(i) This is immediate from the profit expressions (11) and (B.2).
(ii) Profits under DP (12) are larger than under OP (B.2) if and only if G >−s2/(2b).
(iii) Profits under DP (10) are larger than for the national firm under OP (19) if and only if
2(a− c)2 +9s2
18b
> 0.
Profits for the multinational under OP (19) are larger than under DP (10) if and only if
G <
[4(a− c)+3s][4(a− c)−3s]
18b
= G′.
But this holds because G < GO1 and Assumption 1 ensures that G
O
1 < G
′:
G′−GO1 =
[2(a− c)−3s][10(a− c)−3s]
72b
> 0.
(iv) Profits under OP (B.1) are larger than under DP (10) if and only if
[2(a− c)−3s][10(a− c)−3s]
72b
> 0,
which holds by Assumption 1.
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) If G < GD, bilateral FDI takes place under DP and OP and the tax principles are equivalent.
(ii) If GD < G < GO2 , there is bilateral FDI in equilibrium under OP and intra-industry trade
under DP. Now W DI >W
O
B (W
D∗
I >W
O∗
B ) if and only if
G >
s[2(a− c)−3s]
6b
= G˜.
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But, since
GD− G˜ = s
2
4b
> 0,
it follows that GD > G˜ and so G > G˜. Because of Assumption 1, the range of plant costs
we are considering is nonempty:
GO2 −GD =
[2(a− c)−3s]2
36b
> 0.
(iii) If GO2 < G < G¯, there is unilateral FDI in equilibrium under OP and intra-industry trade
under DP. We have W DI >W
O
U if and only if
G >
s[2(a− c)−3s]−2(a− c)2
6b
= Gˆ.
But
GO2 − Gˆ =
8(a− c)2−3s[2(a− c)−3s]
18b
,
has a minimum of 7(a− c)2/18b > 0. It follows that GO2 > Gˆ and so G > Gˆ. Also, W O∗U >
W D∗I if and only if
G <
(a− c− s)(a− c+3s)
6b
= G¯.
The range of plant costs we are considering is nonempty because of Assumption 1:
G¯−GO2 =
(a− c)2 +3s[2(a− c)−3s]
18b
> 0.
(iv) If G¯ < G < GO1 , there is unilateral FDI in equilibrium under OP and intra-industry trade
under DP. We showed in (iii) above that W DI > W
O
U when G > G
O
2 . We also showed that
W D∗I > W O∗U if and only if G > G¯. Finally the range of plant costs is nonempty because
Assumption 1 ensures that
GO1 − G¯ =
[4(a− c)+3s][8(a− c)−3s]
72b
> 0.
(v) If GO1 < G, there is intra-industry trade under both tax principles. We have W
O
I >W
D
I (and
W O∗I >W
D∗
I ) if and only if
[2(a− c)−3s]2
72b
> 0,
which holds by Assumption 1.
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Proof of Proposition 6. If GO2 < G < G
O
1 there is unilateral FDI in equilibrium under OP and
intra-industry trade under DP. We have W OU +W
O∗
U >W
D
I +W
D∗
I if and only if
G <
(a− c)2 +6s[2(a− c)−3s]
18b
= G˘.
Now
G˘−GO2 =
6s[2(a− c)−3s]2− (a− c)2
18b
≥ 0
if and only if
18s2−12(a− c)s+(a− c)2 ≤ 0.
It follows that G˘≥ (<)GO2 if s ∈ (/∈)[ 16 (a− c)(2−
√
2), 16 (a− c)(2+
√
2)].
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